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Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives
Neil Gilberl
INTRODUCTION
Although the details remain unsettled, a blueprint of the Congressional
proposal for reform of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program was included in the 1995 Budget Reconciliation Bill
(vetoed by the President). It is a blueprint for change that will alter the
essential character of AFDC. If Congress has its way, funding for the
program will be converted from an open-ended categorical grant to a block
grant capped at $16.3 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2002. Recipients
will be required to work within two years of receiving benefits, with
eligibility for cash assistance limited to no longer than five years over their
lifetime. The proposal for reform includes additional nuances such as fiscal
incentives tying increases in block grants to reductions in out-of-wedlock
births and a provision allowing states to exempt 15% of their AFDC
case loads from the five-year limit on eligibility.!
Basically, however, it is the block grant and work requirement
reinforced by time-limited eligibility that constitute the fundamental
transformation of AFDC - achieving Bill Clinton's campaign promise to
"end welfare as we know it," if not exactly along the lines he envisioned.
While it is clear that AFDC will no longer be the same, there is much
uncertainty about the consequences of this radical reform. The following
analysis surveys the problems and prospects of state-level experiments

* Neil Gilbert is Acting Dean and Chemin Professor of Social Welfare at the School
of Social Welfare, University of California at Berkeley. His most recent publication is
WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING SOCIAL EQUALITY (Yale University Press, 1995).
1. SOCIAL LEGISLATION INFO. SERV., Budget Reconciliation Act Social Programs , WASH.
SOCIAL LEGISLATION BULLETIN, Nov. 27, 1995, at 85, 86. On August 22, 1996, after this
Symposium took place, President Clinton signed the the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 11 0 Stat. 2105 (1996).
Among other provisions, the Act dismantles the sixty-one-year-old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Id.
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fostered by block grants, the future of public welfare services under block
grants, and the inherent limits of work requirements. The analysis
concludes with an alternative approach to welfare reform that avoids some
of the problems and issues raised by the Congressional proposal.

I. Block Grants: Ending EntitlementlPromoting Experiment
The proposal to shift federal funding for AFDC from an open-ended
entitlement to a block grant reduces federal spending on welfare, constrains
the right to public aid, and consigns the basic responsibility for these
programs to state agencies. Under the block grant arrangement, states will
be squeezed fiscally but administratively freed to experiment with AFDC,
redesigning the program according to their preferences.
In anticipation of the block grants, states are starting to experiment with
their AFDC programs. More than two thirds of the states have already
adopted one or more experimental measures designed to change the
behavior of welfare recipients, thus securing federal waivers of the
categorical policy that currently governs AFDC. 2 Aimed at encouraging
self-sufficiency, these experimental measures involve policies that tie
benefits to the requirement that recipients show progress toward a high
school equivalency diploma, penalize recipients whose children do not
attend school, and deny benefit increases to mothers who have additional
children while on the rolls. 3 Some states have initiated measures that allow
an AFDC mother to retain the portion of the public assistance grant that is
meant to provide for her child if she marries a person who is not the child's
father 4 - an incentive for AFDC mothers to get married, but not to the
father of their children.
Through the use of incentives to change human behavior, these various
experimental measures are expected to reduce public costs of AFDC and to
increase labor force participation. But this kind of social engineering does
not always go exactly as planned. Indeed, the anticipation of unexpected
results is, perhaps, the most dependable lesson to be drawn from past
experiences of major shifts in social policy. As block grants free states to
experiment with AFDC, there are possibilities for unintended outcomes of
incentive-oriented policies designed to reduce costs and AFDC caseloads.
There are four types of unintended outcomes that may emerge from

2. Douglas 1. Besharov & Karen N. Gardiner, Paternalism and Welfare Reform, PUB.
INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 70, 82.

3. James J. Florio, New Jersey's Different Approach, PUB. WELFARE, Spring 1992, at
7, 7; Robert Greenstein, Cutting Benefits vs. Changing Behavior, PUB. INTEREST, Winter
1996, at 22, 22-23; Lawrence M. Mead, How Should Congress Respond, PUB. INTEREST,
Winter 1996, at 14, 14.
4. Florio, supra note 3, at 7.

Summer 1996]

IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

325

incentive-oriented policies. 5
First, measures that penalize welfare beneficiaries for failing to do what
is expected of them (attending job training, actively searching for jobs, and
participating in public work projects) may generate high administrative costs
that vastly override projected savings. These costs stem from efforts to
insure compliance and to manage procedures for appeal; the appeal process
can be particularly expensive when adjudication requires diagnostic
judgments about welfare recipients who claim they are unable to comply
with program demands because of physical ailments, psychological
disorders, addictive behaviors, disabilities, family emergencies, and the like.
For example, consider the experience in the multi-layered appeals structure
of the Disability Insurance program under which a claimant who is denied
benefits can request a reconsideration by the state agency; if denied again,
the claimant can seek a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ);
and if denied by the judge the claimant has final recourse to a review by the
Appeals Council. In 1993, 746,425 cases were appealed at the State agency
level; 346,423 of those cases proceeded to a second appeal before the ALJ,
and 68,253 went on to the Appeals Council. 6
Second, measures that encourage and enable positive behavior, such as
the provision of training and day care services, not only increase program
costs initially, but may result in higher costs over longer periods. This is
because these measures are vulnerable to the familiar problem of "creaming," whereby additional benefits are delivered to those already highly
motivated, most of whom would be likely to find work in the absence of
these incentives. Such was the experience of earlier efforts at welfare
reform. Among AFDC recipients, there are always some number of
beneficiaries who will exit the rolls through their own efforts. Sar Levitan
and Robert Taggart's evaluation of the Work Incentive Program (WIP), for
example, revealed that most of 25,000 WIP enrollees who had gotten jobs
by 1970 were among the applicants best prepared for work - those who
would probably have found employment sooner or later without the
additional WIP benefits. 7
Third, measures that limit access to welfare benefits can reduce
immediate costs of AFDC, only to have these costs reappear in other
program areas. Thus, if welfare mothers are denied benefits for failure to
find work, remain in school, or other reasons, the declining cost of public
assistance will eventually be met with rising public expenditures for

5. NEIL GILBERT, WELFARE JUSTICE: RESTORING SOCIAL EQUITY 79-81 (1995).
6. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1030 CONG., 20 SESS., OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: THE 1994 GREEN BOOK 56, 57 (Comrn. Print 1994).
7. SAR A. LEVITAN & ROBERT TAGGART III, SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND
MANPOWER POLICY: THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY 52 (1971).

if ieft; iiili*

326

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

homeless shelters, child protective services, and food stamps. This is
already happening. After California reduced state spending on AFDC by
$10.8 billion in 1991, state budget analysts calculated that federal payments
for food stamps to the state's residents rose by $4 billion. 8 In the process
of shifting the public burden from AFDC to other programs, the initial loss
of benefits may exacerbate the problems of those in need, raising the long
run costs of support and reintegration.
Finally, measures that substantially reward beneficiaries of various
programs for returning to work run the risk of creating a moral hazard. The
problem, as Carolyn Weaver points out, is that these measures "deal[] with
only half of the work incentive issue, ignoring entirely the incentives
created for people still at work.,,9 The problem is pointedly illustrated by
a successful AFDC "workfare" graduate who was highly publicized as a
model case --until it was revealed that she had left a job to go on welfare
in order to receive the job training provided by workfare benefits to welfare
recipients entering the labor force. lO Beyond such anecdotal evidence,
Duane Leigh found that the Family Independence Project, a five-year
demonstration program in Washington that provided welfare clients
financial incentives and increased social services, had little impact on
earnings, but led to an increase in welfare receipt. ll Similarly, Robert
Moffitt's estimates from a microsimulation model suggest that under certain
conditions the benefits derived from employment and training programs
positively effect the entry rate onto welfare rolls.12
In assessing the prospects of social experiments that are likely to
multiply under block grants, one should not overlook the obvious point that
the success of many incentive-oriented policies rests, in part, on the
availability of jobs for those whom these policies intend to motivate. A
strong demand for labor is itself an incentive for workers to undertake
training or retraining. 13 In periods of high unemployment, incentiveoriented measures may press a few more workers into the labor market. At

8. Douglas J. Besharov, The Welfare Balloon: Squeeze Hard on One Side and the
Other Side Will Just Expand, WASH. POST, June II, 1995, at C4.
9. Carolyn L. Weaver, Reassessing Federal Disability Insurance, PUB. INTEREST, Winter
1992, at 108, 120.
10. Mickey Kaus, The Work Ethic State, NEW REpUBLIC, Jui. 7, 1986, at 22, 28.
11. Duane E. Leigh, Can a Voluntary Workfare Program Change the Behavior of Welfare

Recipients? New Evidence from Washington State's Family Independence Program (FIP),
141. POL'y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 567, 567 (1995).
12. Robert A. Moffitt, The Effect of Employment and Training Programs on Entry and
Exitfrom the Welfare Caseload, 15 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 32, 39-48 (1996). The
results also show small negative effects on entry rates, which are attributed to the burdens
of participation in work programs. Id.
13. Walter W. Heller, Employment and Manpower, in MEN WITHOUT WORK 68, 92
(Stanley Lebergott ed., 1964).
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the same time, however, many welfare beneficiaries will experience an
increasing level of frustration as the social pressures created by behavioral
incentives to work encounter limited opportunities for employment. Thus,
incentive-oriented policies may wind up demoralizing those they are
designed to encourage.
In addition to experimentation with incentive-oriented policies, block
grants will also allow states much greater latitude in defining eligibility
standards and setting benefit levels. At the same time, the overall reduction
of federal aid proposed under the block grants will create fiscal pressures
on the states. Some critics fear that this will result in a race to the bottom,
as states cut benefits not only to reduce immediate costs but to discourage
welfare migration from neighboring states. 14 If recent proposals from New
York's Governor Pataki are any indication, the race may already have
started in anticipation of Federal reforms. The Governor's proposal
includes a plan to reduce New York's AFDC grants by 26%, which would
bring New York's benefits to the same level as New Jersey's.lS
Block grants will increase fiscal pressures and administrative license to
experiment with measures designed to reduce AFDC costs and promote selfsufficiency. They may even trigger a race to the bottom. Will welfare
recipients be motivated to work under the new arrangements? Will they
suffer greater deprivation? Will welfare costs decrease? The shift to block
grants introduces many concerns about unanticipated consequences of
incentive-oriented policies and the extent to which social engineering or a
flat reduction in grant levels will influence behavior and change welfare as
we know it for the better. But there are other implications of the block
grants-not as evident as welfare cost and client behavior-that bear on the
future of public social services.

II. The Future of Public Social Services Under Block Grants
Since the early 1970s, there has been considerable growth in third-party
purchase of service arrangements, through which public funds are used to
pay for services delivered by private agencies. 16 This contracting for
services is certain to increase under block grants for welfare and the
increase is likely to be concentrated among community-based agencies.
Recently, I attended a meeting at which half a dozen directors of

14. Fear ofAttracting Poor Could Push States to Slash Aid, Vol. 4, No. 11,4 WELFARE
TO WORK, Pub. No. 11, 84, 84-85 (MIl Publications, 1995).
15. James Dao, Pataki to Propose Sharply Reducing Welfare Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 1995, at 1,47.
16. Sheila B. Kamennan & Alfred J. Kahn, Child Care and Privatization under Reagan,
in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 235, 244-45 (Sheila B. Kamennan et al. eds.,
1989); NEIL GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 7-10 (1983).
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welfare departments in California were asked the following question: If the
congressional proposals to create a block grant for welfare programs were
implemented and the state passed the block grant through to the county
level, what would you do? Hypothetically liberated from federal regulations
that suffocate initiative, free to experiment and allocate funds as local needs
dictate, the welfare directors all agreed on one immediate course of
action--they would increasingly contract for services with community based
organizations in the private sector.
The recent enthusiasm for contracting with private locally-based
organizations represents a level of commitment to community-based
agencies that has not been seen since the community action movement of
the mid-1960s. It is a commitment inspired by the felicitous convergence
of two popular assumptions which suit the free market ideology of the right
and the citizen participation/empowerment objectives of the left: first, that
privatization offers the most efficient approach to the production and
delivery of social services;l7 second, that community-based agencies are
more effective and responsive than public bureaucracies because they reside
closer to the people being served, mediating between the individual and the
state. l8
Under the first assumption, the case for the efficiency of privatization
is linked to both the presumed advantages of competition and the failings
of public bureaucracies that operate outside the market constraints of cost
and competition (under governments responsive to interest group bargaining). Those who question this assumption, suggest that the market
metaphor does not exactly apply in the realm of social services because the
forces of competition responsive to consumer choice are undermined by
third-party purchase of service arrangements. l9 The entire transaction is
perceived by neither the individual consumer who does not pay for the
service nor the purchasing body, (public agency) which does not receive the
service. Moreover, social service consumer populations--<;hildren, elderly,
and poor--are often vulnerable and not well-informed consumers. In the
absence of the market discipline imposed by well-informed consumers who
pay for what they get, third-party purchase of services can have a difficult
time insuring the quality of services being delivered. This is what Henry

17. NEIL GILBERT & BARBARA GILBERT, THE ENABLING STATE 34 (1989); Ken Judge
& Martin Knapp, Efficiency in the Production of Welfare: The Public and the Private

Sectors Compared, in THE fuTURE OF WELFARE 131, 131-32 (Rudolf Klein et al. eds.,
1985).
18. Robert N. Bellah, Community Properly Understood: A Defense of "Democratic
Communitarianism, " THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1995-1996; HARRY SPECHT &
MARK COURTNEY, UNFAITHFUL ANGELS 152-75 (1994).
19. Susan Rose-Ackennan, Social Services and the Market, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1405,
1405-06, 1412 (1983).
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Hansmann describes as the "contract failure theory.,,2o
Competitive bidding for third-party contracts has been used in efforts
to address the problem of contract failure, which stems from the absence of
competition and consumer choice. Evaluations of the competitive bidding
mechanism in several areas of service, however, suggest that the results
neither reduce costs nor enhance service quality.21 "Proxy shopping" is
another method recommended to introduce the discipline of market
competition into purchase-of-service arrangements, by contracting with
service providers who can attract paying customers (who serve as proxyshoppers for public agencies). 22 Still, there must be enough suppliers to
form a competitive market, which is often not the case when dealing with
community-based agencies. Even if competition can be introduced into
purchase-of-service arrangements, the problem remains that the transaction
costs of contracting are quite high; these costs include complicated
measurements to determine the price of units of service being purchased and
expensive procedures to then monitor the quality of what is delivered. 23
One answer to these criticisms is that the transaction costs of purchasing
services from private agencies may be mitigated by contracting with
community-based agencies. The rationale is that community-based agencies
will be accountable and responsive to their local consumer-constituency.
Consumers influence these agencies by participatng directly in their
governance structure. In essence, these agencies are local groups serving
their own communities. Thus, even though the consumers do not pay for
the services they are receiving, they are nevertheless in a strong position to
influence the quality of these services. Under these circumstances the
transaction costs of contracting can be reduced because monitoring for
quality would be conducted by the consumers who have the power to
influence their local organizations.
Contracting then may be seen not only as a method for more efficient
and effective delivery of services, but also as a mechanism for promoting
the democratization of social services. Community-based agencies are
mediating institutions-local, private, and responsive to the people
served--that provide a cushion of civil society between the individual and
the state. The case for contracting with community-based agencies is

20. Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 27, 29-32 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
21. Mark Schlesinger et al., Competitive Bidding and States Purchase of Services: The
Case of Mental Health Care in Massachusetts, J. OF POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT., Winter
1986, at 245, 251-55.
22. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1412-15.
23. Rosabeth M. Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing Well While Doing Good:
Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit Organizations and the Need for a
Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 20, at 154, 155-58.
I
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further supported by the view that by minimizing the role of government in
the delivery of social services these "mediating institutions will once again
have the space to flower, reclaiming their rightful place at the center of a
revitalized civil society.,,24 Thus, one might argue that public contracting
for the delivery of social services with community-based agencies will
produce more efficient and effective services, promote democracy and
revitalize civil society. There is, however, another view of the trend toward
contracting with community-based agencies that is somewhat less sanguine.
Whether community-based agencies are more effective in delivering
social services than public bureaucracies is an empirical question. Although
such agencies are less bureaucratic, reside closer to the people being served
and are more responsive to local influences, such characteristics do not
guarantee greater effectiveness in service delivery.25 More to the point,
abstract discourse on civil society, responsiveness and citizen empowerment
tends to ignore the harsh fact that there is often a dense concentration of
social problems in communities with the highest proportions of AFDC
recipients. As Fred Wu1czyn reports, one out of eight children born in
some of New York's poorest neighborhoods are admitted to foster care as
infants. He estimates that the cumulative rate of foster care placement in
these communities may be approaching 20%.26 Plagued by high levels of
child abuse, family disorganization, and crime, these communities are, if not
dysfunctional, at least extremely difficult to organize for constructive
participation in the affairs of local agencies.
Effectiveness and local responsiveness aside, the plain fact is that
community-based agencies often deliver social services for lower costs than
public bureaucracies. They deliver services for less because they pay their
workers less than the public bureaucracies, which represent, perhaps, the
last stronghold of the union movement in the United States. From 1970 to
1991 union membership in the U.S. declined from 28% to 16% of the labor
force and over the same period union members in government employment
increased from approximately 10% to 40% of all unionized labor. 27 One
reason, of course, is that organized labor in government is largely in the
service sector; unlike industrial production, these service jobs could not be

24. Charles Krauthammer, A Social Conservative Credo, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1995, at 15,
16.
25. As Peter Blau observed long ago, bureaucracy and democracy are different modes of
social organization for decision-making and implementation that are effective for different
ends. See PETER M. BLAU, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 105-108 (1956).
26. Fred Wulczyn, Status at Birth and Infant Placements in New York City, in CHILD
WELFARE RESEARCH REVIEW 146, 149-50 (Richard Barth et al. eds., 1994).
27. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. 411-12 (1981); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 422 (1992).
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shipped overseas to be performed at a lower cost. Instead, they are now
being contracted out to local community organizations, which are relatively
small, voluntary non-profit units that have few ties to organized labor.
Ironically, efforts to revitalize civil society through support of
geographically-based mediating institutions are being promoted at the cost
of functionally-based communities of organized labor, which also constitute
powerful mediating institutions. Indeed, in his classic analysis, Emile
Durkheim noted: "A nation can be maintained only if, between the State
and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups
near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in there sphere of
action.,,28 With organizations based on territorial divisions (villages,
districts) becoming less important, Durkheim envisioned occupational
groups emerging to fill the void and recreate a sense of social solidarity.
Philosophical arguments about the place and functional role of
community institutions in civil society will not mitigate the increasing fiscal
pressures on State Departments of Welfare to contract out the delivery of
services under block grants. After weighing all the consequences, the shift
from public social services to community-based delivery structures may be
desirable. But first, the trade-offs should be made explicit, particularly the
implications for organized labor and the future role of public social services.

III. Why Work Requirements and Time Limits Won't Work
Although they may not entirely agree on the details of welfare reform,
policymakers on both sides of the political spectrum are joined in the view
that work must replace welfare and that dependency on public aid must be
abolished. This sentiment is firmly expressed not only in the Republican
proposal, but also in Bill Clinton's campaign statements that welfare
recipients should be required to work after two years. 29 A moderate echo
is heard in the centrist Democratic Progressive Policy Institute's call for
reform:
An enabling strategy for welfare reform should buttress America's
basic values, especially reciprocal responsibility.... Social
responsibility is a two-way street: Government can help only those
determined to help themselves. An enabling state should condition
social supports on recipients' willingness to work and strive toward
self-sufficiency. 30

28. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 28 (George Simpson trans.,
1933).
29. Douglas J. Besharov, A Monster of His Own Creation, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1995,
at A31.
30. WILL MARSHALL & ELAINE C. KAMARCK, Rep/acing Welfare with Work, in
MANDATE FOR CHANGE 217, 233 (Will Marshall et al. eds., 1993).
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Under the current proposal for welfare reform, states receiving block
grants are given almost complete license to redesign their programs with
two major conditions: recipients must be required to work after two years,
and recipients remain eligible for cash assistance no longer than five years.
What would happen to welfare recipients who were unable to secure
employment after the first two years? One response is that those who had
not found a job after two years would be required to participate in some
form of public works program established by the state. This is a toughsounding quick fix that ignores three compelling problems.
First, those unemployed after two years are likely to include many of
the least skilled and least motivated in the welfare population, a group
poorly prepared for employment even in public works projects. The reading
skills of the typical AFDC teen-age mother, for example, are estimated to
range from below the sixth grade to the eighth grade leve1. 31 Findings
from the Columbia University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
(1994) indicate that 37% of AFDC mothers between the ages of 18 and 24
abuse or are addicted to alcohol and drugs. 32 Since they rely on selfreports of abuse and include frequent and infrequent use, these findings are,
at best, a rough approximation of the problem.
Second, even if inadequate education and substance abuse are not at
issue, the social and economic costs of employing these AFDC mothers in
public works are staggering. Estimates by the Congressional Budget Office
indicate that expenditures for supervision and day care would amount to
$6,300 per participant. 33 ·With the average AFDC grant totalling about
$5,000, participation in mandatory work programs would more than double
the costs for each welfare recipient, without any increase in their basic
grant. Fiscal concerns aside, the cynicism and demoralization bred by
make-work would surely undermine the already shaky standards of public
bureaucracies.
Finally, questions remain concerning what to do about AFDC recipients
who refuse to participate in either training programs or public works, and
what to do about those who malinger on the job. Following the various
state experiments with incentive-oriented policies, the response to this
behavior would no doubt range from a sharp reduction to the total
suspension of the AFDC grant. In any event, the grants would be slated for
elimination after five years.

31. Lloyd Pryor, The Single Welfare Mother and Deficiency in Reading, 15 YOUTH POL 'y
38, 41 (1994); Besharov & Gardiner, supra note 2, at 77.
32. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WOMEN ON WELFARE, 1,2 (Columbia University's Center
on Addiction and Substance Abuse ed., 1994).
33. Douglas Besharov, Escaping the Dole; For Young Unwed Mothers, Welfare Reform
Alone Can't Make Work Pay, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1993, at C3, C4.
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Work requirements and time-limited AFDC policies that result in the
reduction and eventual elimination of the AFDC grant are remarkably
evasive about what will happen to the children in these families, for whom
the program (first called Aid to Dependent Children) was originally devised.
The five-year time limit, particularly, is stone silent regarding the fate of
children once benefits are terminated. If enacted as proposed, these
measures will be to welfare in the mid-1990s what deinstitutionalization was
to mental illness in the mid-1960s. The deferred costs of that decision still
plague our cities today.
As the focus of concern has shifted from protecting children to
requiring that AFDC parents go to work, policy initiatives encounter the
limits of social engineering in this realm. This is not a new story.
Analyzing the costs and results of the early "workfare" reforms more than
twenty years ago, Gilbert Steiner observed:
Unfortunately, the sorry history and limitations of day care and
work training as "solutions" to the welfare problem could not be
faced by the administration's welfare specialists in 1970.... But
after a few years it will inevitably be discovered that work training
and day care have had little effect on the number of welfare
dependents and no depressing effect on public relief costs. Some
new solution will then be proposed, but the more realistic approach
would be to accept the need for more welfare and to reject
continued fantasizing about day care and "workfare" as miracle
cures. 34
The new solutions now being proposed involve radical variations on
workfare that are more stringent in their demands, but no more likely to
succeed than earlier schemes which, as Steiner notes, had little effect on the
number of clients or AFDC costs.

IV. Welfare Reform: A Child-Centered Alternative
The Congressional proposal to transform AFDC overlooks the fact that
welfare as we know it often works well as a social safety net. For many
families, AFDC serves not as a poverty trap, but as a temporary support in
hard times. Research based on annual data indicates that about 48% of all
AFDC spells last less than two years. 3S An even higher proportion of
short-stays emerge from analysis based on monthly data, which indicates

34. GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 74 (1971).
35. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS ANo MEANS, 1030 CONG., 20 SESS.,

supra note 6,
at 440. The figure of success for short-tenn cases can be somewhat misleading since onethird of these cases will enroll in AFDC again sometime in the future. Id.

334

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:2

that 700/0 of initial spells on welfare last two years or less. 36 The picture
changes, however, when the analysis shifts from the length of spells for
everyone who received welfare benefits over the last ten years to an
examination of the length of spells for those on the welfare rolls at anyone
point in time. Here, the research based on annual and monthly data indicate
that at any point in time about 50% of those on welfare are in the midst of
spells that will last eight years or more. 37 Thus, looking at the AFDC
population over a ten-year period, the typical recipient would be a shortterm user, while at any point in time during that period the AFDC rolls
would be composed predominantly of long-term users.
Reform measures that ignore the substantial proportion of successful
short-term cases are likely to increase program expenses still further. That
is, providing various transitional incentives to work after two years on
AFDC raises the costs of public support for all those families that
previously would have left the rolls in the absence of these benefits. The
essential problem with the current proposal for welfare reform is that it does
not distinguish among recipients in terms of competence and motivation.
It deals too generously with those who are most competent and motivated,
and too harshly with the recipients who are least competent and motivated.
Can anything be done to make welfare more equitable without
increasing the cost of benefits by the creation of transitional incentives and
public works programs? Can welfare be made equitable without implementing time-limits and financial sanctions that would impose hardships on
children? An alternative approach to welfare reform begins with the need
to distinguish among AFDC families and to insure the well-being of
children. 38 This is no simple matter.
Families enter the AFDC program for different reasons and remain on
the rolls for varying periods of time. About 600/0 of AFDC spells begin
because of either a decline in family earnings or a divorce (or separation)
of married couples with children. 39 These cases need to be treated
differently from the 30% of AFDC spells that begin when an unmarried
woman has a child.
The reason is simple. Welfare applicants who were married or
employed for some period of time, say at least 18 months prior to
enrollment in AFDC, had been independent citizens abiding by social
conventions. It is reasonable to presume that they are competent and
motivated to become self-sufficient. Thus, applicants who are pushed into
36. Id. at 441-42.
37. Id.
38. The design of this child-centered approach to welfare reform draws on the proposal
developed by Neil Gilbert. See GILBERT, supra note 5, at 169-72.
39. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, l03D CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 6,
at 451.
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the program because of a marital break up or a decline in their family
income should be awarded AFDC benefits and left alone for two years to
reorganize their lives. A high proportion of them will be among the 48%
to 70% of recipients who leave the welfare rolls of their own volition in
less than two years. 40 Those remaining on AFDC after two years would
then be enrolled in the first phase of intervention, which leads to what
might be termed "managed dependency.,,41
Women who enter the AFDC program because of out-of-wedlock births
are another matter. For one thing, they are younger and more likely to be
long-term recipients than those in the other group. Estimates of the risk for
long-term welfare receipt indicate that over 40% of never-married women
with a young child who enroll in AFDC under the age of twenty six will
spend ten years or more on the welfare rolls. 42 Futhermore, their children
are at greater risk of harm, as indicated by this group's excessive rates of
child abuse and neglect. 43 The risk of abuse is even greater when the
single parent is a teenager. 44
More than other segments of the population, policymakers want to get
tough with unwed-teenage mothers, in part because their long-term reliance
on welfare is very costly. The appeal of firm work requirements and timelimits is that they will seemingly put an end to the pattern of long-term
welfare dependency by never-married single-mothers. While AFDC no
doubt contributes to this pattern of dependency, it did not create the singlemother culture of poverty and will not eliminate it with time-limits. But
this group should be targeted for special intervention, if for no other reason
than to protect the children at risk.
The selective focus and compulsory nature of the special interventions,
such as home-health visiting, proposed for AFDC teenage mothers run
counter to the conventional liberal view that government programs should
be universal and voluntary--universal so that services do not discriminate
in ways that might label some groups as less worthy or competent than
others, and voluntary so that they do not impose any kind of social control.
Even though children most at risk are found disproportionately in the
households of teenage mothers on AFDC, one might ask, why not provide
special interventions for all families? To be sure, some children outside of
teenage AFDC families would benefit from a universal approach to social

40. Id. at 441, 442.
41. GILBERT, supra note 5, at 169.
42. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 6,
at 451.
43. Lorraine V. Klerman, The Relationship Between Adolescent Parenthood and
Inadequate Parenting, 15 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REv. 309, 317 (1993).
44. Kristin C. Collins & Mariam R. Chacko, Adolescent Parenthood: Role of the
Pediatrician, 15 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REv. 295, 298 (1993).
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intervention. However, to the extent that one views home health visits, for
example, as a form of surveillance and social control meddling in family
life, targeting the intervention imposes public authority on fewer households
and is less intrusive for the general population. Moreover, to the extent that
risk to children is disproportionately high among teenage AFDC families,
targeting the intervention allows for a more efficient allocation of resources.

V. What AFDC Refonns Should Insure Children's Well-being?
Instead of emphasizing forced labor and "make-work" schemes, the
child-centered alternative would be divided into two phases of social
supervision. The first phase would involve a service strategy aimed to
provide practical assistance to mothers and protection to their children.
These efforts would center around weekly or bi-weekly home-health visiting
that would offer support to young mothers, as well as careful supervision
of their childcare practices. This intense periodic monitoring is probably
the best form of protection that the state can furnish against abuse and
neglect of young children, short of high quality institutional care. In very
high risk cases where more protection is needed than that afforded by
periodic home-health visiting, group homes would be made available for
unwed-teenage mothers and their children, substituting AFDC benefits in
the form of board and care for cash grants. Along with home-health
visiting, efforts to help AFDC mothers would include encouragement of
school drop-outs to complete their high school requirements, assistance in
home management, and development of systematic plans for reintegration
into the labor force.
After three years, those still on AFDC would enter the second phase in
which greater social controls would be employed, reflecting the recipients'
emerging status as "wards of the state," rather than temporary dependents.
Home visiting to monitor the well-being of children would continue and the
level of public assistance grants would remain the same. During this phase,
however, a case manager would be assigned to exercise increased regulation
over each family's financial affairs, which would entail the manager's
payment of rent, utilities, and weekly allocations of food stamps. There
would also be increased monitoring of any outside resources available to
recipients, which would reduce their AFDC grants.
Tightening social control through case managers and home health
visitors would certainly raise the cost of AFDC, though with brief training,
welfare recipients might fill many of the home-visiting jobs. This approach
will not eliminate long-term dependency. It would, however, still be a
relatively inexpensive way for society to protect vulnerable children, while
giving notice that long term public dependence would be accompanied by
greater public surveillance. Increasing the role of public authority in
recipients' lives would make welfare less attractive to some who might
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otherwise be employed. Closer monitoring would also limit the amount of
unreported income, which is quite frequently available to supplement AFDC
grants. 45
This is a modest goal. Those who demand more would do well to heed
Steiner's counsel against "tireless tinkering with dependent families.,,46
Although AFDC may help to sustain the never-married single-parent culture
of poverty, welfare did not create this unhealthy pattern of behavior, and
forces larger than those generated by welfare reform will be required to
eliminate it.
Indeed, a serious effort to reduce welfare must go well beyond
adjustments in AFDC. Make-work, time limits, and transitional benefits are
no substitutes for employment in the private sector that leaves working
people substantially better off than those receiving a combination of
welfare, food stamps, and Medicaid. The best and fairest incentive is to
increase the work-related benefits of the low-paying jobs that many welfare
recipients might perform. Progress has been made along these lines with
the expansion of tax-based social transfers, such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC). Many policy analysts urge increasing these indirect social
transfers and adding other tax -based supports so that working families are
lifted above the poverty level. 47 Working families also need the security
of medical protection, which welfare recipients receive through Medicaid.
Finally, there is widespread agreement that absent fathers should be held
responsible to provide financial support for their children, though resources
for such support may be rather limited among fathers of children in the
AFDC population.
Even with all this, dependency will not disappear. Whether due to
personal deficiencies or forces beyond their control, people in need of care
will always be with us. Social reforms aimed at alleviating dependency
should not condemn children for the hard luck or personal frailties of their
parents.

45. Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, The Real Welfare Problem, AM. PROSPECT,
Spring 1990, at 31, 32-33.
46. STEINER, supra note 34, at 31-74.
47. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 23738 (1988); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 233-34 (1992).

